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INTRODUCTION

[I]t is a general and indisputablerule, that where there is a legal right, there
is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.
1
-Chief Justice John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison

* J.D. & M.A. (Philosophy) Candidate, Stanford University 2010. For comments on
earlier versions of this paper (and countless others) I thank Jacek Pruski. For inspiring this
paper, and the next generation of civil rights litigators and academics, I thank Professor
Pamela Karlan. Deepest thanks to Norman Spaulding for providing invaluable comments
and support on earlier drafts of this paper and investing countless hours of mentorship and
discussion into the success of this project and those yet to come. The staff of the Stanford
Law Review provided excellent edits and support. Any remaining errors are of course all
mine.
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Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is defect of right. A
right is as big, precisely, as what the courts will do.
-Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 2

The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure ...
against unreasonable searches and seizures," 3 but determining what this right
means and how it should be vindicated has, to put it mildly, long been
controversial. 4 In fact, because of the "wide applicability of government
intrusions, ranging from countless thousands of daily intrusions at airports,
traffic stops, drug testing, traditional criminal law enforcement practices,
regulatory intrusions[,] . . . and many other searches and seizures, the
Amendment is the most commonly implicated and litigated part of our
Constitution." 5 Perhaps the most contentious element in the controversy
surrounding the Fourth Amendment is determining how to enforce it-whether
by the exclusionary rule, which requires unlawfully obtained evidence to be
suppressed from a criminal prosecution; a civil damages remedy; an
administrative sanction; or some other means.
The remedial controversy surrounding the Fourth Amendment also
implicates broader questions about the relationship between a right and its
remedy, evidenced by the pair of quotes above. These questions are both
abstract and practical. On the abstract side, Chief Justice Marshall's "general
and indisputable rule" from Marbury exhibits the deeply-held normative
principle that when a right is declared it ought to be accompanied by an
attendant remedy. Llewellyn affirms this principle by noting that the causal
relationship also runs in the other direction: without a remedy, there is no right.
On the practical side, Llewellyn's comment underscores that what courts do, as
opposed to what they say, is the effective regulator for the scope of a given
right. That is, even if a court says a lot about the value of a right, the manner in

1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 109 (1783) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 83-84 (1951).

3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). Throughout this paper I frame the Fourth
Amendment primarily in terms of security, not privacy or property, though the security
formulation certainly includes overlapping protection that resounds with the others
formulation. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REv. 101 (2008)
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment protects security, which provides a textually stronger
basis for Fourth Amendment claims and would result in more doctrinal coherence than a
privacy-based protection).
4. See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 13

(1966) ("Few decisions of the United States Supreme Court have generated as much
powerful controversy over the past few decades as those dealing with issues raised under the
Fourth Amendment."); cf Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as
enunciated [by the Supreme Court], has not-to put it mildly-run smooth").
5. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION,
at xix (2008).
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which it vindicates that right is really what determines its value.
Evolving notions of property, privacy, and security, coupled with changed
circumstances in the world-like the professionalization of the police force and
the expansion of methods to eavesdrop and obtain data-have meant that "what
the courts will do"-and what they will find constitutionally reasonablechanges too. Each era defines its version of the careful balance between order
and liberty embodied in the Amendment, 6 meaning its doctrine expands and
constricts over time.

Two decisions from the Supreme Court's 2008 Term indicate that "what
the courts will do" has been, and may continue to be, restricted under the
Roberts Court. First, in Herring v. United States, 7 the Court split 5-4 and
refused to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in an arrest made
where the officer erroneously believed-due to poor, negligent police
recordkeeping-that a valid warrant justified the arrest, making the search a
Fourth Amendment violation. The holding appears narrow: "when police
mistakes are the result of negligence . . . rather than systemic error or reckless
disregard of constitutional requirements," the exclusionary rule does not
apply. 8 Yet, by finding that the costs outweighed the benefits of exclusion for
"negligent," as opposed to systemic, widespread errors, the Court further
weakened the primary criminal law remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent decried the Court's new constriction with the
practicality of Llewellyn. She noted, "The exclusionary rule ... is often the
only remedy effective to redress a Fourth Amendment violation." 9
Second, in Pearson v. Callahan, 10 the Court unanimously invoked
6. As Landynski's seminal history puts it, the issues covered by the Fourth
Amendment "bring into sharp focus the classic dilemma of order vs. liberty in the
democratic state." LANDYNSKI, supra note 4, at 13. On one hand, some argue that construing

the Fourth Amendment has "often proved heedless of the community interest in eradicating
crime and has gone too far in the direction of protecting individual liberty," while on the
other hand some claim that the "Court has sometimes been too accommodating to the claims
of law enforcement and insufficiently vigilant in safeguarding the principles on which the
Fourth Amendment is based." Id.; cf CLANCY, supra note 5, at xx (casting the same tension
and musing that "perhaps [the Court's] choices come down to this: is the Amendment
designed primarily to protect individuals from overreaching governmental invasions or is it
designed to regulate law enforcement practices?").
7. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
8. Id. at 704.

9. Id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Interestingly, this observation
has been made even by some conservative commentators. Radley Balko, a conservative
journalist, sympathizes with the fact that "[c]onservatives have long despised the
exclusionary rule" because it lets criminals go free, but concludes exclusion is necessary

because "[t]he problem is that right now, it's really the only remedy. If police officers can
make a case against someone using evidence they obtained illegally, what's to stop them
from disregarding the

Fourth Amendment

entirely?" Radley

Balko,

Eroding the

Exclusionary Rule: Why the Supreme Court Got It Wrong in Herring, REASON ONLINE, Jan.
28, 2009, http://www.reason.com/news/show/131311.html.
10. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
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qualified immunity to bar a section 1983 suit against officers who searched a
defendant's home in reliance on the "consent-once-removed" doctrine, finding
the right not "clearly established" at the time of the violation.1 ' Pearson's
significance, though, stems from its decision to abandon the sequencing rule of
Saucier v. Katz, which required courts to address the question of whether a
constitutional violation had occurred before addressing the clarity of its
establishment for qualified immunity purposes. Now, "while the sequence set
forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as
mandatory."' 3
Notably, both of these cases purport to deal solely with Fourth Amendment
remedies, not the right itself, but, as Llewellyn and Chief Justice Marshall
demonstrated, these remedy-centered decisions implicate both sides of the
right-remedy nexus.1 4 To interpret the remedial relationship between Herring
and Pearson, this Comment adopts Darryl Levinson's "remedial equilibration"
thesis, which argues that rights and remedies are "inextricably intertwined." 1 5
Under this view "[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just for their
application to the real world, but for their scope, shape and very existence."16
Conversely, both cases adhere to a form of "rights essentialism" by
disaggregating right from remedy and assuming that any limits imposed on the
scope of the remedy will not affect the underlying right. This strategy is
dangerously inattentive to the consequences of alterations to the rights-remedy
nexus. Thus, I argue that when viewed from the perspective of remedial
equilibration, Herring and Pearson take on new significance: they diminish the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment itself.
My primary aim is to demonstrate the practical and theoretical relationship
between rights and remedies embodied in Herring and Pearson. This approach
has doctrinal consequences, and I elaborate some of them below, but I leave the
task of comprehensive doctrinal analysis to others less concerned with the
specific relationship between the right and remedy at the core of this Comment.
The analysis proceeds in the following manner: After briefly describing the
"remedial equilibration" concept in more detail (Part I), Parts II and III

II. Id. at 812-13.
12. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
13. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
14. This distinguishes two other Fourth Amendment cases--coincidentally, both
coming out of Arizona-in the 2008 Term where the Court considered the scope of the right
itself. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment prohibited school officials from conducting a strip search of a student
suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus in violation of school
policy, though the officials were entitled to qualified immunity); Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct.
1710 (2009) (holding that a warrantless search of a car was unconstitutional where the
defendant has been arrested and locked in the back seat of the patrol car).
15. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 CoLUM. L.
REv. 857, 857 (1999).
16. Id. at 858.
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consider Herring and Pearson,respectively, in light of the equilibration thesis.
Part IV then considers the potential cumulative effect of these decisions. I
conclude that, although Marbury's right-remedy linkage has never been taken
literally,' 7 Fourth Amendment violations where unlawfully obtained evidence
is included, but the right is not "clearly established," have no remedy. Nor are
citizens assured that future officers engaging in the same conduct will be liable
or face any serious consequences. Together then, these cases turn Marbury on
its head; in some instances, rights presumptively lack an adequate legal
remedy.

I.

ABANDONING RIGHTS ESSENTIALISM: THE REMEDIAL EQUILIBRATION
INSIGHT

In Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,Daryl Levinson attacks
"rights essentialism," which remains prevalent in constitutional discourse. This
discursive approach "assumes a process of constitutional adjudication that
begins with judicial identification of a pure constitutional value," i.e., right,
whose purity is "corrupted by being forced into a remedial apparatus that
translates the right into an operational rule applied to the facts of the real
world." 18 To rights essentialists, "[r]ights occupy an exalted sphere of
principle, while remedies are consigned to the banausic sphere of policy,
pragmatism and politics."1 9 As such, "judicially mandated remedies are only
provisionally warranted by their master-servant relationship with the rights they
are designed to enforce." 20 Implicit within the rights essentialist paradigm,
then, is the assumption that treating rights wholly apart from their remedies has
no reciprocal effect on the underlying right.
Though rights essentialism may be adopted as a theoretical basis meant to
strengthen the underlying right,21 in case law, essentialism typically shows up
in a rights-abridging form. Herring's approach is typical: assume, without
deciding, the constitutional rights question and begin tinkering with remedies.
In the civil rights context, purporting to leave a formal right intact while
constricting the "remedial machinery" provides an "insidious" method for a
court to "retrench civil rights protections."2 As Professor Pamela Karlan
17. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw,

109 YALE L.J. 87, 87-88 (1999).
18. Levinson, supra note 15, at 858.

19. Id. at 857.
20. Id. at 858.
21. Ronald Dworkin, whose aim is undoubtedly the expansion of rights protection, has
been the primary analytic force behind this approach, but has been subjected to some
criticism by others, like Levinson. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIoUSLY chs. 67 (1978); Levinson, supra note 15, at 926-31.
22. Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the PrivateAttorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv.

183, 185. Here, Karlan distinguishes "insidious" remedial abridgment as a means of
constricting a right from the more direct act of reinterpreting the scope of the right itself,
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notes, "[a]t best, this will dilute the value of the right, since some violations
will go unremedied. At worst, it may signal potential wrongdoers that they can
infringe the right with impunity." Notably, both of these effects alter the right
and do so through remedial abridgment, not by actually curtailing the scope of
the right itself-undermining the essentialist notion that a right can be
"assumed" or formally left intact when considering remedies without
reciprocally affecting its meaning.
Karlan's insight shares theoretical similarity with Levinson's "remedial
equilibration" view, which rejects the notion that remedies are "subordinate"
and "metaphysically segregated" from the philosophical "purity of rights."24
Instead, the equilibration perspective argues that "the only way to see the
constitutional right . .. is to look at remedies." 25 Levinson identifies three
trends evident when being attentive to the rights-remedy nexus: (1) remedial
deterrence, where the right is shaped by the nature of the remedy that will
follow if violated; (2) remedial incorporation, where a right effectively
incorporates a remedy (typically through the prophylactic, preventative
injunctive relief); and (3) remedial substantiation, where the value of the right
is determined by remedial changes, that is, "expansion and contractions ...
[that] functionally alter[]" or "change[] the practical meaning of the right." 26
Looking at Herring and Pearson through the remedial equilibration lens
reveals that both remedial deterrence and remedial substantiation are present in
each case. For the exclusionary rule, which has long been defined in terms of
deterrence, 27 the remedial deterrence aspect of the decision is nothing new, but
what makes Herring significant is its potential signal of refused exclusion for
any "negligent" police error. Here, remedial substantiation occurs because the
Fourth Amendment will cease to protect citizens from these tort-like errors and,
accordingly, expand the amount of unlawful activity police can engage in with

which did not occur in Gant or Redding, see supra note 14, though, as discussed, Redding is
another excellent example of the equilibration thesis.
23. Id. at 185.
24. Levinson, supra note 15, at 870-71.

25. Id. at 880. Another way to conceive of the rights essentialist and remedial
equilibration views is to compare Langdellian formalism to Llewellyn's realism in regards to
what the "law" is. In the formalist paradigm, legal rules can be abstracted from broad
principles, which are thereby self-executing and apolitical. The realist perspective, however,
is hostile of this conception of law, because it ignores the practicalities of daily life. Cf
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("General
propositions do not decide concrete cases."). Taken a step further, the essentialist approach
has analytical similarity to attempts to draw a bright-line distinction between "law" and
"policy"-the former being superior, and the latter subservient to true law. Meanwhile, the
remedial equilibration approach shares some similarity with critics of the policy-law
distinction who argue that all law is inherently political. See generally DAVID KAIRYS, THE
POLITICs OF LAW (1998).
26. Levinson, supra note 15, at 889, 905, 910.
27. See infra Part II.
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impunity.28
Likewise, Pearson involves elements of remedial deterrence and
substantiation. Qualified immunity itself acts like a deterrence-based remedial
arrangement: by decreasing the costs of announcing new constitutional rights,
the Court should more freely do so because it does not have to worry about
retroactive application that might create crushing waves of litigation.

As a

consequence, should abandoning Saucier result in more questions decided on
the "clearly established" prong, this deterrence-based relationship is altered,
and, as an act of remedial substantiation, the domain of arguably
unconstitutional but tolerated police conduct increases, effectively weakening
the value of the right.
The next two Parts consider more fully how these decisions walk down the
rights essentialist path, which, I argue in Part IV, may make the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees against executive intrusion a "dead letter" for those
subject to unlawful searches and without criminal-context or civil remedies. 30
II.

HERRING IMPAIRED: EXCLUSIONARY RULE ESSENTIALISM

Before moving on to the Court's reasoning, I provide a brief synopsis of
the facts in Herring, and, as relevant, the development of the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule more generally.
When Bennie Herring stopped by the Coffee County, Alabama Sherriff's
Department to retrieve something from his impounded truck, Investigator Mark
Anderson spotted him and, recognizing him from their past, 31 asked the
warrant clerk to check for any outstanding arrest warrants. Finding none,
Anderson asked the clerk to check with her Dale County counterpart, who
28. This also distinguishes Herring from the Court's last brush with the exclusionary
rule, Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), which relied heavily on the prospect of
alternative methods of enforcing a Fourth Amendment violation. In Herring, however,
Justice Roberts makes no mention of what remedy Herring might have for the acknowledged
violation.
29. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009)
(broadening Fourth Amendment protection for school students, but doing so in a manner that

prevented the school district officials from being liable for damages).
30. The specter of the Fourth Amendment becoming a "dead letter" was recognized
and expressly avoided by the Court as the federal exclusionary rule developed. See, e.g.,

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) ("If letters and private documents can thus
be seized and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of
no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.").

31. One troubling aspect of Herring's arrest is that it was the result of Anderson's
personal identification of him and, despite seeing no unlawful conduct, potentially singling
him out in retaliation for their prior conflicts. Specifically, "Herring had told the district
attorney, among others, of his suspicion that Anderson had been involved in the killing of a
local teenager, and Anderson had pursued Herring to get him to drop the accusations."
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 705 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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reported that their computer database indicated there was an active warrant for
Herring's arrest due to a failure to appear. When the Coffee County clerk asked
for a faxed copy, however, the Dale County clerk could not find it-the warrant
had been recalled some five months prior.
In the interim ten to fifteen minutes, however, Anderson arrested his target,
Herring, and in a search incident to arrest found methamphetamine and a gun in
his truck (which was unlawful as a consequence of a prior felony conviction).
The search, therefore, was made without probable cause or pursuant to a valid
warrant-a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Court narrowed the
issue and noted that "[t]he parties here agree that the ensuing arrest is still a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but dispute whether contraband found
during a search incident to that arrest must be excluded in a later
prosecution."32 Put differently, the parties agreed that there was at least some
rights violation; the only question for the Court was what remedy, if any,
should be available. 33
More generally, the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule has been the
Court's primary remedy in the criminal context for Fourth Amendment
violations, but was not initially conceived as a mere "remedy" or "policy"
matter subject to deterrence-based balancing. In fact, Weeks v. United States
and other early exclusionary rule cases come near to treating exclusion in a

"remedial incorporation" sense, where the remedy almost defines the right
itself. 34 But, since the Court disaggregated suppression from the constitutional
right, it has subsequently construed the exclusionary rule in terms of
deterrence, not constitutional necessity. 35 As Stone v. Powell, which limited the
exclusionary rule in the habeas context, reasoned:
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is deterrence of police
conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. It is not
calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or
seizure, for any reparation comes too late.... Instead, the rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally

32. Id. at 698 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
33. See id. (acknowledging the parties' agreement that the "arrest [wa]s ... a violation
of the Fourth Amendment," making the issue whether the exclusionary rule should be
applied).
34. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)
(Holmes, J.) (explaining that the "essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
court but that it shall not be used at all").
35. The first Supreme Court decision to disaggregate the exclusionary rule as a remedy
apart from an entitlement related to the Fourth Amendment directly was Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), where Justice Frankfurter held that state officials were required
to follow the Fourth Amendment, but that exclusion was not mandatory for these officials.
This of course changed in Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the federal rule to state actors. 367
U.S. 643 (1961). As far as the deterrence-based rationale goes, this interpretive strain really
took hold in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1973).
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through its deterrent effect. 36

Herring appears to uncontroversially affirm the logic and deterrence-based
reasoning of Stone, but from a remedial equilibration standpoint, we should
also observe that the absence of a remedy for Bennie Herring means that, for
him, the Fourth Amendment's guarantees mean nothing. Put in Levinson's
terms, increasing instances where exclusion, conceived as a "judicially created
remedy," does not apply (as the Court has done consistently) 3 7 reduces the
deterrent function of the rule, and, crucially, diminishes the value of the right
itself (remedial substantiation).
The Court's rationale comes in two big steps, which I consider next.
A. Passageof Time

The Chief Justice starts by using the temporal and spatial attenuation
between the bookkeeping error and the unlawful search as a mechanism for
both (a) minimizing the rights violation and (b) subsequently separating the

violation from the remedy applied during the criminal prosecution. There are
three temporally significant moments: (Tl) the Dale County Clerk's error in
relying upon the faulty computer database, (T2) the unlawful arrest, and (T3)
the use of the unlawfully obtained evidence in the criminal prosecution.
Finding that the Dale Country recordkeeping error was an act of "isolated
negligence attenuated from the arrest," 38 the court sees T 1 as the relevant point

for considering whether suppression is warranted. But the attenuation between
T1 and T2, of course, does not make the arrest any more constitutional. Instead,
this attenuation might make it more problematic. In situations where officers
are required to make split-second decisions in a volatile or dangerous situation,
or are worried about the spoliation of specific evidence, "reasonableness" may
justify a greater degree of error. This is the basis for the "exigent
circumstances" exception to a warrant requirement, and it generally makes
sense. 39 When, however, as in Herring, the arrest is not a response to an

immediate danger (or probable cause to believe that one exists), and no
"exigent circumstances" are present, the scope of "reasonable" police conduct
should be narrower, not broader. 4 0
36. 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (creating the
"good faith" exception to exclusion because it should apply only where it "'result[s] in
appreciable deterrence"' (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976))).
37. As Carol S. Steiker has argued, these "inclusionary rules" have long been
expanding, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?Two Audiences, Two

Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2469 (1996), and have disturbing implications for the
value of the Fourth Amendment.
38. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
39. See generally CLANCY, supra note 5, § 10.6 (describing exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement).
40. The Court has made similar distinctions when addressing excessive use of force
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The relationship between T2 and T3, to the Court at least, also has
remedial significance. The Court draws a sharp distinction between the
unlawful search itself and the subsequent use of that information to effect a
conviction. So if exclusion of evidence is meant to remedy the unlawful search,
as Stone put it, the "reparation comes too late." But from the remedial
equilibration perspective, this disaggregation of rights violation from the
remedy may be more troubling than the first. If we broaden the scope of the
Fourth Amendment violation by acknowledging the entire set of consequences
flowing from an initial search, the Fourth Amendment violation, I posit,
actually continues throughout the prosecution. The use of unlawfully obtained
evidence during the criminal prosecution further disrupts the security that the
Fourth Amendment was meant to protect.

If, for example, I were to break into current Republican Party Chairman
Michael Steele's house and take his diary or private journal (an unlawful
search), and then subsequently broadcast the information on MSNBC, the harm
would not stop with the trespass and theft, but would continue through the
subsequent dissemination that was made possible only through the antecedent
lawless act. In fact, the continued intrusion that results from the subsequent
dissemination is likely greater than the mere trespass. Embarrassing facts or
confessions, should there be any, become harmful only when disclosed. This
subsequent use also likely motivates the theft of private information in the first
place. While I might find the journal personally riveting, I took it to make the

information public and, presumably, to reap the benefits of this public
disclosure. The same is true when officers unlawfully arrest or search
individuals, and subsequently use the unlawfully obtained evidence in a public
forum (the courtroom); the constitutional injury continues during the criminal
prosecution, and (typically) explains why the officers sought the information
(or property) in the first place.41
Broadening the scope of the Fourth Amendment violation to include T3

does not mean that suppression is required in every instance, or that no "fruit of
the poison tree" can ever be used. That would be a strong form of remedial
claims, finding that level of force unconstitutional when individuals are fleeing on foot, but
justified where officers have to make split-second decisions in the face of an ongoing pursuit
that creates a public safety threat. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (laying out
the contours of the doctrine regarding deadly force); see also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194, 201 (2004) (per curiam) (deadly force not excessive where officer is chasing defendant
who gets into automobile after altercation and begins driving away).
41. In my example, MSNBC would likely have a First Amendment right to broadcast

anything I told them about from reading the journals, see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001). In the Fourth Amendment context, however, when state actors violate the law
initially, subsequent use is not cured by transferring the unlawfully obtained evidence to

another official. This is why the Court did away with the "silver platter" doctrine that
permitted state officials to unlawfully obtain evidence and give it to federal officials for a
federal prosecution. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Most important for
present purposes, though, is to examine the nature of the injury involved and see that harm

does not end when the journal is taken, but continues and is exacerbated by subsequent use.
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incorporation. What is important, though, is that construing the Fourth
Amendment's remedial machinery in the narrow form seen in Stone and
Herringhas implications for the right itself and is thereby relevant to how we,
and the Court, might think about the right.
The Steele example also tracks the difference between past and ongoing
violations. In the former, a court's remedial goal is merely the rectification of a
prior harm, while the latter addresses a "continuing state of affairs." 42 In
distinguishing prior and continuing injustice, though in a different context,
Jeremy Waldron provides another illustration of this distinction. Suppose a
court is confronted with a car thief and acts to rectify the harm. Waldron
explains that "[tiaking the car away from the thief and returning it to me, the

rightful owner, is not a way of compensating me for an injustice that took place
in the past; it is a way of remitting an injustice that is ongoing in the present." 43
As before, the continued use of unlawfully obtained property is part of the

violation. The exclusionary rule works in roughly the same manner: a piece of
property was wrongfully obtained by government intrusion and suppression
eliminates the intruder's ability to continue to use the unlawfully seized
property. Maintaining that ex post usage has no relationship to the initial

unlawful seizure misses the distinction between ongoing and past violations by
refusing to consider what this remedial limitation means for the Fourth
Amendment itself.
That said, there is certainly a big difference between a car and, for
example, illegal drugs, to which the individual was never entitled. This issue
raises a different set controversies related to exclusion, and I avoid this debate.
Instead, the example is meant to illustrate only that in most cases of unlawful
seizures the violation does not end merely when the object is taken, but
continues so long as it is used by the intruder. The matter is one of perspective.

In Herring, because the Court sees the remedial question as a purely historical
matter, T3 is irrelevant, while, if we perceive the violation as ongoing, T3

emerges as a significant aspect when considering how to vindicate the Fourth
Amendment.
Again, these criticisms of Justice Roberts's reliance upon temporal

"attenuation"-between (1) the bookkeeping error and the unlawful search and
(2) the unlawful search and the use of the unlawfully obtained property in the

process of the criminal prosecution-do not mean that exclusion is requiredto
remedy an unlawful act. Rather, I have attempted to show that limiting the
exclusionary rule for these two reasons means something for the right. In the

first instance, it emasculates the significance of the right by loosening the
standard required of officials in a manner inconsistent with the rationale behind
the exigent circumstances doctrine. In the second instance, the exclusionary

rule is considered unnecessary because the Court presumes the constitutional

42. Jeremy Waldron, Superseding HistoricInjustice, 103 ETHICs 4, 14 (1992).
43. Id.
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violation ends with the search and does not continue into the subsequent
prosecution.44 Seeing the relationship in this fashion means "the causal arrow
runs from the remedy to the warrant component of the Fourth Amendment
right, not the other way around.'' 45
B. "Negligence" as a Trigger

The second, and perhaps more significant, essentialist step comes when the
Court seems to raise the trigger for exclusion. 4 6 The Chief Justice relies on the
"crucial" fact that the police error was "negligent, but ... not . . . reckless or
deliberate." 47 To the majority, then, "when police mistakes are a result of
negligence . .. rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional
requirements," the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. 48
One could easily say that the negligence-based dispute is really just about
how the majority, contrary to the dissenters, calculates the balance of costs and
benefits of exclusion in this particular instance: quintessential deterrence-based
remedial reasoning. We might also argue about whether the Court
underestimates the value of exclusion, or overestimates the costs of suppressing
evidence for police enforcement. This debate, while relevant and interesting, is
different from my concern here.
Significant for my purposes is the fact that the Court operates on the
presumption that right and remedy are hermetically sealed. That move permits
it to proceed unworried about consequences of ratcheting up the exclusionary
trigger. In terms of remedial deterrence, this decision reduces police officers'
incentives to refrain from (or at least exercise due care to avoid) violating the
Fourth Amendment. While one can only hypothesize precisely how this change
will affect the right, it likely means at least three things: (1) criminal defendants
can expect to have more unlawfully obtained evidence used against them in the
criminal prosecution; (2) more individuals will be convicted and/or receive
longer sentences (e.g., drug convictions often rely on quantities obtained, and
exclusion would prevent sentence enhancements); 49 and (3) more individuals
44. The Court has addressed a variant of this argument before and, in rights essentialist
fashion, rejected it. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (concluding that
grand jury questions based on exposure to unlawfully obtained evidence "work no new

Fourth Amendment wrong. Whether such derivative use of illegally obtained evidence by a
grand jury should be proscribed presents a question, not of rights, but of remedies").
45. Levinson, supra note 15, at 896.

46. The potential significance of Herring and the implications of a negligence standard
were quickly noticed. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Step Closer to Repeal of Evidence

Ruling, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2009, at Al; Balko, supra note 9; Tom Goldstein, The
Surpassing
Significance
of
Herring,
SCOTUSBLOG,
Jan.
14,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/the-surpassing-significance-of-herring/#more-8528.

2009,

47. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009).
48. Id. at 704.

49. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006) (providing escalating penalties related to drug
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will be subject to unlawful searches that turn up nothing, reducing the
substantive value of the Fourth Amendment right applied to these individuals.
In short, Herring simultaneously increases the likelihood of official lawlessness
while reducing the sanction for doing so. This is quintessential remedial
substantiation: "limitations on the consequences of violating [the Fourth
Amendment] ... change[] the practical meaning of the right." 5 0
The third consequence is perhaps the most troubling. As Justice Ginsburg
notes, "the most serious impact of the Court's holding will be on innocent
persons wrongfully arrested based on erroneous information [carelessly
maintained] in a computer data base." 5 1 Suppose, for instance, that an
individual is completely innocent and law-abiding but is wiretapped or
otherwise searched negligently. Herringwaters down the rights for this class of
individuals by reducing the costs of these unconstitutional incursions, thereby
increasing their likelihood. This, perhaps, explains Justice Ginsburg's remark
that the "exclusionary rule is a 'remedy necessary to ensure that' the Fourth
Amendment's prohibitions 'are observed in fact."' 5 2 Effectuating the
enumerated protections of the Fourth Amendment requires some sufficient
consequence to deter overreaching police conduct, and in a manner different
from ex post civil liability, as Justice Stewart has explained, the exclusionary
rule "compel[s] respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." 53
So, though exclusion is not a "necessary consequence of a Fourth
Amendment violation," 54 (indeed, it cannot be; many unlawful searchers may
turn up no excludible evidence) limiting the exclusionary remedy does impact
the rights protection afforded by the Amendment. But, if exclusion is not
required, what is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation?
Unsurprisingly, given his essentialist approach, Justice Roberts demonstrates
little regard for this question, and leaves us to speculate how we should think
about the other primary form of remedies for Fourth Amendment violationscivil damages, a matter left for Pearson.

quantity).
50. Levinson, supra note 15, at 910.

51. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
52. Id. at 707 (quoting Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-SeizureCases, 83

COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1389 (1983)).
53. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
54. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (emphasis added).
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STRENGTHENING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: PEARSON V. CALLAHAN

A. Farewell Saucier
Like Herring, the Court's remedial analysis in Pearsondeserves attention
with respect to its meaning for Fourth Amendment rights. The facts are

relatively simple. Afton Callahan sold methamphetamine to an informant
working to clear his own pending charges, who Callahan had voluntarily
permitted to enter his trailer home. Then, on the informant's signal, officers
who were part of the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force entered Callahan's
home, arrested him, and conducted a warrantless search of his trailer. The
evidence obtained was used to secure his conviction, and the state argued that
"exigent circumstances" justified the warrantless search. On appeal, however,
the state conceded exigent circumstances were not present, but argued that the
inevitable discovery doctrine justified the use of the evidence. The Utah Court
of Appeals disagreed and vacated Callahan's conviction, leading him to file a
section 1983 suit for civil damages alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.
The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on qualified
immunity grounds, but also addressed the Fourth Amendment question directly.
Noting that Callahan's claim implicated the "consent once removed" doctrine,
"which permits a warrantless entry by police officers into a home when consent
to enter has already been granted to an undercover officer or informant who has
observed contraband in plain view," 55 the district court assumed that in light of
Georgia v. Randolph 56 the Supreme Court would deem this search
unconstitutional. Interpreting Randolph in a similar, though not identical,

fashion, the Tenth Circuit held the search unconstitutional, but, controversially,
also ruled that the right was clearly established at the time of the offense,
affording the officers no qualified immunity. 57
In Pearson, however, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Tenth
Circuit on the qualified immunity issue, and did so without addressing the
underlying rights question or the contours of the consent once-removed
doctrine. In so doing, the Court reworked the structure of the qualified
immunity inquiry under section 1983 and overturned part of Saucier v. Katz. 5 8
Under Saucier, courts were required to address the constitutional violation
before asking whether the right was "clearly established" to determine whether
the officers would be liable. After Pearson, this sequence, while "often
appropriate ... should no longer be regarded as mandatory." 59
55. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 814 (2009).
56. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). Randolph dealt with the related question of third-party
consent but, notably, did not actually explicitly address the "consent-once-removed"
doctrine.

57. See Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 898-99 (10th Cir. 2007).
58. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
59. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
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Situated within the continued evolution of the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and its remedies, Pearson's abandonment of Saucier sequencing
goes a step further than the Rehnquist-era balance of individual and collective
interests embodied in its qualified immunity doctrine. 60 Qualified immunity
makes it easier for courts to expound new constitutional rules, because each
time they do, they need not fear that the courthouse doors will be flung open by
plaintiffs attempting vindication of this (newly pronounced) right. This
remedial device generally permits relatively cost-free rights expansion, though
only

prospectively.

Like

Teague's

non-retroactivity

principle, 6 1 which

generally means applying new rules to pending cases on direct review only,
qualified immunity "facilitates-and may be a prerequisite for-the creation of
new rights by reducing the cost of inventing them." Pearson, however, alters
this balance by allowing (though not requiring) courts to hop-scotch the rights
issue and address a dispositive (and presumably unrelated) question about the
remedy. Despite the low-cost understanding of qualified immunity and
constitutional remedies advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist and evident in
Saucier and Teague, in Pearson the Court held that expounding the right first
can, in fact, be a quite pricey endeavor. 6 3 To address the potential remedial
60. In many ways Saucier was the result of Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of the
qualified immunity compromise: judges should address the constitutional issue but need not

worry about imposing liability on unwitting officers who have acted in good faith but
nonetheless violated the Constitution (another form of remedial deterrence). See Wilson v.

Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) ("Deciding the constitutional question before addressing
the qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for official

conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public.").
61. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
62. Levinson, supra note 15, at 889; see also id. at 890 (arguing that the Court would
have never created Miranda warnings "if the warning requirement had applied retroactively
so that every prisoner had to be released from custody on post-conviction review").

Reducing the cost of expanding rights for disfavored groups, like criminal defendants, is also
important for the courts as an institution in two respects. First, disfavored groups lack the

protection of the political process and rely on the courts as a bulwark against state
overreaching. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Second,
reducing the costs of expounding rights helps limit congressional intervention through
controlling Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. After Miranda, for example, Congress
expressed its disapproval by attempting to strip the jurisdiction of federal courts to consider

these claims, which the Court struck down. See United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428
(2000); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.1, at 174-75 (5th ed. 2007).
Congress, then, understands that a "change in the substantive law," that is, to the right, might

be made by limiting the availability of a remedy through "a procedural device."
CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 177. See generally Laurence Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering:
Zoning Disfavored Rights out of the FederalCourts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129 (1981).
On a related note, even before Teague the Court proceeded in the no-retroactivity

compromise for the exclusionary rule. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)
(holding that the exclusionary rule need not operate retrospectively upon cases decided prior
to Mapp); see also LANDYNSKI, supra note 4, at 172 (suggesting additional strategic reasons
why the Court waited four years after Mapp to decide the retroactivity issue).

63. As an aside, to the extent that Saucier, authored by Justice Kennedy, was the
product of the Rehnquist era, and Pearson, joined by Justice Kennedy, is representative of
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consequences of Pearson I next consider the "costs" that motivated the Court to
overturn Saucier.

B. Saucier's Price
Pearson acknowledges that addressing the constitutional question first
"promotes the development of constitutional precedent and is especially
valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which
a qualified immunity defense is unavailable." However, the opinion then
quickly jumps into essentialist policy mode by noting eight (depending on how
you count them) "price[s]" of always addressing the rights question.
The first two costs involve resources: that of the judiciary and the parties
litigating, respectively. Of the former, when it is "plain that a constitutional
right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such
a right," addressing the rights violation is an "essentially academic exercise." 65
This statement is an implicit repudiation of the rights-essentialist paradigm. By
deeming the promulgation of a novel or emerging right "academic," the Court
essentially says the costs of considering the remedy outweigh the right itself.
This, from the remedial equilibration perspective, makes sense: when faced
with costly right promulgation Courts tend to (1) restrict the underlying right
(here, by emasculating it as "academic" and ignoring it altogether) or (2)
restrict the remedy available for the right (as it did when curtailing the remedies
available for Brown v. Board of Education violations 6 6). Notably, again, the
the Roberts-era direction of the Court, one wonders what Pearson signals. It might be as
simple as error correction (hence the unanimity), but the broad sweeping tone of Justice
Alito's opinion and some of the language might provide the Court with authority for further
remedial abridgment. In particular, when determining whether a right is "clearly
established," the Court, relying on Justice Rehnquist's language in Wilson, notes that the
officers were "entitled to rely" on out-of-circuit precedent though their circuit had not yet
ruled on consent-once-removed entries into a residence. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 823; id.
(citing Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618) ("In Wilson, we explained that a Circuit split on the relevant
issue had developed after the events that gave rise to suit and concluded that '[i]f judges thus
disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for
picking the losing side of the controversy."'). Though Pearson and Wilson involved
decisions below that created a circuit split, the logical implication of the Court's language
goes beyond this situation: where a circuit split exists, officers should not be subject to
money damages merely because they are on the "losing side" of a controversy. While the
Court certainly does not go this far, one wonders whether there are seeds for this controversy
sown here. The Court's reluctance to impose damages in the absence of fair warning, while
understandable, is ironic given its well-established rule that the existence of a circuit split on
the interpretation of a criminal statute is not ambiguous enough to trigger the rule of lenity,
meaning potentially lawful actors who have been prosecuted are not similarly spared from
picking the "losing side" of a controversy. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108
(1990).
64. 129 S. Ct. at 818.
65. Id.

66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (preventing
inter-school district remedies for Brown); Levinson, supra note 15, at 874-78 (discussing
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remedial concern essentially drives the limits placed upon the way the court
conceives of the attendant right. Likewise, the resource-reduction worry holds
true for private parties that will also incur costs for litigating the existence of a
constitutional right in addition to the clarity of its establishment.
Third, Saucier is too "pricey" where considering the right fails to make a
"meaningful contribution" to the development of constitutional precedent. 67
Fourth Amendment cases typically fail to perform the "law elaboration"
function-incorporated in the Teague-like compromise of the qualified
immunity doctrine-because "the Fourth Amendment inquiry involves a
reasonableness question which is highly idiosyncratic and heavily dependent on
the facts." 68 As the Court noted in Brosseau, this area is one in which "the
result depends very much on the facts of each case."69 Fourth Amendment factdependency results, in part, because of the Amendment's mushy text"probable cause," "unreasonable searches and seizures" -and necessarily
implies that some mistakes or acts of overreaching (the reasonable ones) will be
permitted. 70

But, when combined with a strong qualified immunity doctrine resting on
the "clearly established" prong, many objectively unreasonable searches will
also fail to entitle a plaintiff to any relief-immunizing these unlawful acts.
Consider, for example, Wilson v. Layne: all nine Justices agreed that having
media ride-alongs that permit video and photographic intrusions into arrestees'
homes was a Fourth Amendment violation, but despite this unanimity, eight of
nine Justices agreed that the officers should be immune from suit because the
violation had not been "clearly established." 7 1 The same type of phenomenon,
though less stark than Wilson, occurred in Redding. There, while eight Justices
agreed that the strip search of a middle school student was a constitutional
violation, the majority fractured on the issue of qualified immunity-with
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissenting on the grounds that the
unreasonableness of the search was clearly established.
Instead, fact dependency may be all the more reason for addressing the
rights-violation question under the Fourth Amendment. If the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches is to retain (or, depending on your perspective,
"obtain") its vitality, some recovery for Fourth Amendment violations must be
afforded. The practice of continued avoidance on Fourth Amendment questions
means, in Herring-esque fashion, that mistakes will not only go unremedied but

school desegregation and remedial equilibration).
67. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 819.

68. Id. (quoting Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 168 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
69. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam).
70. On this score, Chief Justice Roberts rightly notes that "[t]he very phrase 'probable
cause' confirms that the Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision."
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009).
71. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
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instead incentivized. Refusing to consider a constitutional violation unless it is
clearly established rewrites the Fourth Amendment: "The right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures only ifsuch conduct is clearly established at
the time of the violation." This amounts to a substantive limitation on the
Fourth Amendment right-instead of using objective reasonableness as a guide,
officers need only worry about what has been clearly established.
Further, should courts adopt a practice of refusing to address whether
emerging practices violate the Fourth Amendment (note that Pearson does not
require this, but would permit it), rights claims may essentially stagnate. If
previously recognized, a particular act or practice will amount to a rights
violation. If not, despite being objectively unreasonable, nothing requires a
court to deem this practice unconstitutional. 72 On the flipside, one might worry
that Pearson's introduction of increased flexibility would change the
underlying Fourth Amendment doctrine in the opposite direction because the
majority of suits addressing rights development will be decided by so-called
"activist" judges who reach out to expand constitutional protections, which
would presumably skew the doctrine as a whole to the left (except, perhaps, in
the area of the Second Amendment, which would tend right).
Either way,
Pearson could have a significant impact on Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Given these concerns about the appropriate role of judicial review over
Fourth Amendment claims, the fact that Fourth Amendment violations are so
fact-intensive suggests that judges should be especially circumspect in
determining whether a particular situation would be deemed "objectively
unreasonable" through the eyes of the jury that would ultimately be asked to
answer this question. 74 That is, fact sensitivity makes it even more dangerous
to deem a right clearly or unclearly established: the jury might view the
situation differently than a judge ruling on a 12(b)(6) or summary judgment

72. One possible, practical counterargument to this point is that judges, sworn to
uphold the Constitution, will not turn a blind eye to violations and will typically continue to
follow Saucier. While this is certainly true, the realities of swelling caseloads and reasons
laid out in Pearson demonstrate the strong incentive to rule on the "clearly established"

prong whenever the opportunity arises. The introduction of discretion into qualified
immunity sequencing might raise another potential (depending on your theory of judicial
interpretation) problem: so-called 'activist' judges go out of their way to reach (and
presumably expand) the Fourth Amendment question, while a majority of judges do not. As
the argument goes, this might potentially "skew" finding of constitutional violations in an
ideological fashion. This possibility is supported by the fact that, despite being broadly
labeled "generalists," Court of Appeals judges often do "specialize" in areas of their
concern. See generally Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L.
REv. 519 (2008).
73. Related to this possibility, at least at the appellate level, is the fact that Federal
Court of Appeals judges, of varied political valiances, often specialize in areas of their
primary concern. See id.
74. See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 202 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the qualified
immunity inquiry should have been "answered by a jury").
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Fourth, Pearson tells us that addressing the right first will be of "scant
value when it appears that the question will soon be decided by a higher
court." 76 If, for instance, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on a case
involving a clear circuit split, then another Court of Appeals would waste
resources by addressing the constitutional right question. This presumes, of
course, that the Supreme Court will, in fact, address the question. In Pearson,
however, the Court refuses to address the Fourth Amendment right at issue in
the case-the "consent-once-removed" doctrine-or determine, at a minimum,
whether the Tenth Circuit was correct in assuming that Randolph required its
holding. Instead, as it admonishes lower courts to do, the Court addresses the
"clearly established" prong (acknowledging that the decision below created a
conflict, but refusing to resolve it). To be of value, the higher court must
actually rule on the right, 77 and, at any rate, for lower courts, pending potential

binding authority suggests that they should hold a case, rather than rule one
way or the other; this would also reduce the chance of error and conserve
resources.

Fifth is the concern that addressing the constitutional question might rest
on ambiguous state law, but this seems readily distinguishable (as several
courts have already recognized 78), and, at any rate, resolved by the adequate
and independent state ground doctrine.
The

sixth

price

relates

again

to

fact-specificity

issues

in

Fourth

Amendment cases. If qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the
propensity for bad decision making increases because the "factual basis for the
plaintiffs claim or claims may be hard to identify," which makes the two-step
inquiry "uncomfortable." 79 But, as before, this cuts in favor of curtailing
75. A good example of this problem is another Fourth Amendment case, Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), where the Court relied on a videotape to justify its position
about what a reasonable, hypothetical, jury would have decided. See Dan M. Kahan et al.,
Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive

Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) (accepting the Court's invitation to "see for
yourself' whether the police officers' conduct, which rendered a teenager permanently
paralyzed, violated the Fourth Amendment and finding that although many jurors might have
reached the same conclusion as the Court, their reasons for doing so and perception of the
situation were quite different); cf Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 115 (2007) (setting out the thesis that Perilsapplies).
76. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 819 (2009).
77. Frequently the Supreme Court does not, as in Pearson and Herring, actually decide
the constitutional question either. See, e.g., Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 ("We express no view
as to the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision on the constitutional question itself.").
78. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 819 (citing courts that "have identified an 'exception' to
the Saucier rule for cases in which resolution of the constitutional question requires
clarification of an ambiguous state statute").
79. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). I include here the Court's
worry that courts might be faced with "woefully inadequate" briefing on the constitutional
question, id. at 820, because it gets to the same point: it remains unclear exactly what the
asserted rights violation is.
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qualified immunity, not expanding it. Instead, a judge should have a clear
picture of exactly what right was or was not established; encouraging resolution
of the qualified immunity question in the face of factual uncertainty promotes
judicial speculation and raises the potential for hindsight bias (the Court's
seventh concern), rather than reducing it.
Seventh, Saucier's rigid sequencing rule created the problem of hindsight
bias. Judges who have decided that a right was not clearly established at the
time of the violation might be less likely to find a violation in the first place,
which means that forcing them to address the question could create bad law.
That is, knowing that the plaintiff cannot recover makes it harder to say that her
rights have, in fact, been violated.
The problem of hindsight bias is interesting because the Court indirectly
acknowledges the remedial substantiation at work here by noting that the
structure of the remedial inquiry for qualified immunity directly affects whether
the right itself constricts or expands in a particular case. So, given this concern,
what we would want is some type of method for reducing the likelihood that a
judge's first review of a search comes before the assertion of qualified
immunity. In the criminal context, the problem of ex post judicial bias is
tempered by the warrant requirement. Requiring that officers provide ex ante
reasons for their search limits the probability that judges viewing an otherwise
unreasonable search ex post may be implicitly biased by the fact that the
officers actually found contraband. 80 On the civil side, however, there is no
counterpart, and the Court must rely on ex post adjudication to get its first look
at a challenged search. This does mean a problem of hindsight bias exists, but
the Court's response is essentially avoidance of the issue and, once again, a
tendency toward doctrinal stagnation in the face of ongoing violations. Those
asserting rights that were previously recognized will have remedies, but those
asserting new claims might be left with nothing. Thus, given the way
technology and ongoing struggles with terrorism pose new threats to Fourth

Amendment guarantees, stagnation could also have the consequence of making
the Fourth Amendment less effective as a bulwark against state overreaching
because the range of its coverage will be limited to areas acknowledged in the
past.

When courts do announce a constitutional right, however, the Court's
eighth concern kicks in: it may be difficult for "affected parties" (i.e., state
actors, typically police officers) to obtain appellate review of a decision that
may "have a serious prospective effect on their operations" because announcing
a rights violation that is not clearly established will make these officers a
"winning party" typically unable to appeal the first constitutional right
question, making it potentially unreviewable. This problem, however, is not, as

80. See Levinson, supranote 15, at 895-96 ("We might think of warrants as effectively
raising the probable cause standard by eliminating judicial bias that would color ex post
adjudication of the reasonableness of searches that turned up incriminating evidence.").

January 20 10]

FOURTHAMENDMENT REMEDIES

583

the Court concedes, necessarily the consequence of Saucier, but a procedural
"tangle" arising from the Court's unwillingness to entertain an appeal on an
issue on which the party prevailed. 8 1 Yet there are alternative procedural
means of getting around this procedural hurdle. For instance, each qualified
immunity step could be seen as its own appealable determination (which
comports with qualified immunity's status as an exception to the prohibition on
interlocutory appeals). 82

Ninth, Saucier's "two-step protocol departs from the general rule of
constitutional avoidance." 83 The strength of the avoidance canon, however,
seems particularly weak in constitutional litigation. That is, section 1983
creates an entire class of cases where the constitutional question is the very
reason for the suit. Avoidance is relevant where there's a statutory claim (e.g.,
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 84 a child pornography law, 85 or a
jurisdiction-stripping provision 86) that may give rise to a constitutional issue
but need not. By contrast, where a plaintiff alleges that her constitutional rights
have been violated, the response "we generally avoid constitutional questions"
misses the point.
Pearson'sreach should not be overstated. While there is much in terms of
remedial equilibration and the relationship between rights and remedies to be
made out of the Court's analysis and its decision to abandon the eight-year
Saucier experiment, the sky is not falling, and the switch from a mandatory rule
to a discretionary choice does not necessarily mean remedial stagnation. In
fact, the Court's first real opportunity to skip a rights question came and passed
in Redding. We are thereby reminded of the Court's admonishment that "[a]ny
misgivings" concerning the abandonment of Saucier's mandate "are
unwarranted" because lower courts are not prevented from following the
procedure but merely "have the discretion to decide whether that procedure is
worthwhile in particular cases." 87
Yet, given the eight "costs" of Saucier discussed above, we have strong
reason to believe that in the mine run of cases-unlike the Court's first chance
in Redding-the clearly established inquiry will dominate courts'

81.
82.
83.
84.
limiting
85.

Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 820 n.2.
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 821.
See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (avoiding the constitutional question by
the scope of the statute).
See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (abandoning the

most natural reading of the statute to avoid potential First Amendment problem).

86. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (avoiding Suspension Clause issue by
permitting habeas petitions by immigrants despite congressional limitations in deportation
cases under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)).
87. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 821.
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considerations of qualified immunity motions. Pearson counsels, however, that
this implication should not be disconcerting because the "development of
constitutional law" is not "entirely dependent on cases in which the defendant
may seek qualified immunity." 88 Of course constitutional law is not entirely
dependent on section 1983 suits against officers, but the reach of the other
outlets the Court points to-criminal cases, actions against municipalities, and
suits for injunctive relief-have also been limited. First, the exclusionary
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations has been long been weakened by
exceptions and, following Herring, may now be sharply curtailed where police
have acted negligently. Second, while municipalities might not have qualified
immunity, 89 a plaintiff must demonstrate that the violation is pursuant to a
policy, practice, or custom of the city and no respondeat superior liability will
lie. 90 Finally, obtaining injunctive relief, or performing structural reform more
generally, has been sharply curtailed by Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 9 1 and in
other contexts by congressional action.
IV.

A POTENTIALLY PROBLEMATIC DIALECTIC: HERRING AND PEARSON
COMBINED

This Part briefly addresses the relationship between Herring and Pearson
as remedies to Fourth Amendment violations. I first argue that the potential for
no remedy in either the civil or criminal context is a consequence made
available by the combination of these cases and, next, attempt to show more
broadly why this consequence is significant.
A. No Remedy?
When done in both the criminal and civil context, hop-scotching the rights

88. Id. at 821-22.

89. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
90. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Indeed, this development
also demonstrates the equilibration of rights and remedies. Where qualified immunity lowers
the cost of expanding rights violations and, more generally, recovery for individual actions
(remedial deterrence), extending liability to municipalities but simultaneously raising the
threshold for triggering liability essentially serves the same function. One interesting
permutation of this process is in cases where the alleged constitutional violation was a failure
to adequately train officials. Here again, the court curtails the remedy (demanding deliberate
indifference and an exceedingly tight causal nexus) to prevent liability from resting upon
municipalities. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
91. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). The vibrancy of Lyons was recently reaffirmed, albeit in a
different context, in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
92. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996); cf Levinson, supra note 15, at 888 (noting that the PLRA exhibits the remedial
substantiation relationship by limiting the value of the Eight Amendment right by truncating
equitable remedies for violations).
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question for a dispositive remedial question undermines the value of the Fourth
Amendment as a bulwark against executive intrusions into individual privacy
and security. Bennie Herring's prosecution and his potential damages suit are
illustrative. Like the remedial procedure now available after Pearson,Herring
moves to the subsidiary remedy point about deterrence and negligence without
actually discussing the contours of the right at issue-a process that effectively
mirrors what courts do when addressing the "clearly established" question
alone. This move has remedial consequences. By moving to deterrence without
addressing whether, in fact, Herring's rights had been violated and precisely
why, the majority is able to act as if its deterrence-based inquiry has no effect
on the underlying right. But, of course, it does.
Refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in Herring means that unlawfully
obtained evidence is used to sustain his prosecution, which, as argued above,
compounds Herring's (and Michael Steele's hypothetical) injury. On the
Pearson/damages flipside, his attempt at recovery would be similarly futile.
The right not to be subject to a search incident to negligent police
recordkeeping (should it exist) was certainly not "clearly established" before
his case, and, as the Pearson Court itself refused to do, there is no guarantee the
court would consider whether there was a constitutional violation in the first
instance. Nor could Herring make a claim out for injunctive relief. He would
likely have trouble satisfying Rule 11 in his complaint alleging a systemic error
(i.e., the facts, if there, are not available to him), 9 3 and in light of Lyons he
would not have standing for such a suit.
The result? A Fourth Amendment violation without any remedy. If
remedies, as the essentialist thesis maintains, exist wholly apart from their
principled rights counterparts, the existence of unremedied constitutional
violations might not (beyond the individual injustice) be troubling. Yet, the
truncation of remedies also effectively dilutes the Fourth Amendment right
itself. For people like Herring, such a constitutionally guaranteed right has no
meaning. They receive no redress, nor have the contours of the rights violation
been sufficiently developed to prevent future violations. Like the "consentonce-removed" doctrine's continued limbo despite Pearson, the remedial
constriction of the court leaves the Fourth Amendment in a similarly uncertain

status.
Further, the rights dilution made possible at the hand of its remedy also
affects people who, unlike Herring, have done nothing wrong at all. Being
blind to the increased incentive to violate rights by reducing the cost of
violating them not only permits but effectively encourages lawlessness on
93. Justice Ginsburg also pointed out the implications of the systemic error inquiry on
the criminal side: "How is an impecunious defendant to make the required showing? If the
answer is that a defendant is entitled to discovery (and if necessary, an audit of police
databases), then the Court has imposed a considerable administrative burden on courts and
law enforcement." Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 710 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
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behalf of state officials. That is, because Herring means that no negligently
obtained evidence will be excluded, the Court has essentially incentivized
officials, at a minimum, to become negligent with respect to constitutional
guarantees, and, more seriously, to knowingly violate these guarantees because
they face no meaningful consequence for the violation.
B. Alternative Remedies and the Need for ConstitutionalDiscourse
Thus far I have made the case that the remedial consequences of Herring
and Pearson combined will likely have an unfortunate effect upon the
underlying Fourth Amendment right itself. In this Subpart I look beyond these
practical consequences and focus on the element of Levinson's thesis which
emphasizes the role of discourse in constitutional adjudication. For Levinson,
constitutional remedies have no special status above other remedies, and
accordingly, he rejects the notion that remedial construction in constitutional
cases is "special" or somehow different than fashioning remedies in typical
statutory or private law contexts. Courts should, he argues, be as free as they
are in the latter context to fashion appropriate remedies for constitutional
violations. 94

Though I largely share Levinson's aim-to provide a view of judicial
review that permits remedial flexibility for constitutional violations despite the
counter-majoritarian difficulty-I briefly depart from his analysis. Instead, I
argue that part of the significance of Herring and Pearson derives from their
uniquely constitutional nature and that, as part of the relationship between
remedy, right, and injury, constitutional violations and their remedies deserve
some special treatment. Specifically, I argue that because vindication of a
constitutional right always serves a unique public purpose, the remedial
imperative in this context is heightened. Thus, instead of limiting the remedial
options for courts, I conclude (along with Levinson) that courts deciding
constitutional cases should be given, and should exercise, wide latitude in
fashioning appropriate remedies for these violations and tailoring them to the
precise nature of the constitutional harm.
To make my case, I respond to a hypothetical objection to my argument.

One might argue that though federal law leaves criminal defendants/civil
plaintiffs with no effective remedies, state-based, common-law remedies (e.g.,
trespass, battery) might suffice. And that, given that the Fourth Amendment

was long enforced via civil trespass, not section 1983 or evidence suppression,
the recent constriction of these remedies is of no serious concern from a
constitutional standpoint. This view has antecedents in the "traditional" or

94. Levinson, supranote 15, at 931-40.

95. Cf Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971)
(describing broad remedial authority of federal courts sitting in equity to tailor remedies to

constitutional violations).
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"orthodox" view of state courts as primary arbiters of constitutional questions,
which also puts an emphasis on limited federal court jurisdiction embodied in
the Madisonian Compromise. 96
Equating a constitutional violation with state common-law "trespass" first
falters because it wrongly presu poses that private trespass is equivalent to the
public constitutional violation.
Given that rights are meant to serve as a
check, or as Nozick put it, "side constraint" on state action,98 the injury
incurred at the hands of the state, with its duty to protect rights and an exclusive
claim to the legitimate use of coercive force, is qualitatively different than an
injury at the hands of a private individual. This is implicit within the stateaction doctrine: only the state can inflict the type of injury that the Constitution
prescribes.
More broadly, constitutional litigation serves purposes beyond remedying
just the individual's rights and protects the public interest, which means the
remedy serves a function that is simultaneously prospective and historical. 9 9
For instance, the social function of public vindication underlies the concept of
the "private attorney general" employed by civil rights statutes by "providing a

cause of action for individuals who have been injured by the conduct Congress
wishes to proscribe."1 00 State trespass remedies might at one time have
provided individual officers with structural incentives to refrain from acting,101
but they have never served an explicit public interest and, following the rise of
the professional police force, are now less adequate at serving it than they
might have been at the founding.1 02

96. By "orthodox" view I mean the view that the Exceptions Clause, Article III § 2,
gives "Congress ...
plenary power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."
PETER W. Low

& JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE

RELATIONS 260 (6th ed. 2008). From the Exceptions Clause, the orthodox view infers that
federal courts need not provide remedies for every constitutional violation because the state

courts are bound by the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and can be relied upon
to follow and enforce the substantive mandates of the Constitution. For a recent invocation

of this structural view, see Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2119-23 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
97. Cf Abram Chayes, Forward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96

HARV. L. REv. 4,4-5 (1982) (distinguishing private and public litigation).
98.

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29 (1974).

99. See Chayes, supra note 97, at 4-5.
100. Karlan, supra note 22, at 186.
101. As an historical matter, these simple state trespass remedies fail to maintain the
structural incentives motivating the Fourth Amendment at its adoption, which, as Professor
Lessig argues, means that remedial translation is justified. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in

Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165, 1229 (1993).
102. See id. at 1231-32 (arguing that state trespass remedies no longer perform the
function they once served, which provides the need for remedial translation). On the
professionalization of the police force and its implications for Fourth Amendment remedies,
see Carol. S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 820, 83038 (1994) (discussing changed circumstances and the implications of the expanding police
force in contradistinction to the informal constable).
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My claim here goes a step beyond just civil rights statutes with an explicit
or implied cause of action: any adjudication of constitutional infringement
serves this public function. That is, constitutional harms contain an irreparable,
often dignitary, harm that comes from having the guarantee of living in a free
and equal society violated. The imprimatur of the state on police officers'
behavior (and in most instances the use of taxpayer funds to indemnify officers
liable under section 1983),103 changes the character of this injury from mere
private violation to a public harm. Vindicating constitutional rights for an
individual necessarily increases the value of that right for all others. Thus, it is
the nature of the injury which underlies the need for examining the rightremedy nexus.
Of course, this is quintessential remedial substantiation: providing a strong
remedy for one individual increases the value of the collective right. Describing
constitutional violations as mere "trespass," however, denigrates that function
by burying the right even further than Pearson permits by removing the
discursive effect of announcing that the executive has stepped over the line. As
such, even when difficult to price monetarily, like procedural due process
violations,104 the adjudication of a constitutional violation as such at least
permits this harm to be recognized. Recognition, through even its symbolic
value alone, serves to bolster constitutional discourse and creates a political
check on overreaching.
Failure to acknowledge the importance of symbolic and discursive value of
rights promulgation through essentialist right-remedy disaggregation, therefore,
may derive from inadequate attention to the type of injury meant to be
redressed in particular cases. In Herring, for example, which follows Stone's
line that the "reparation comes too late," the Court supposes that the entire
constitutional harm accrues at the arrest phase, and fails to continue into the
prosecution. Re-characterizing the broader, social harm implicated by police
unlawfulness, rather than focusing on deterring arrests alone, would necessarily

change the way courts balance the costs and benefits associated with
suppressing evidence.
Finally, my response to reliance upon state common-law remedies was

meant to demonstrate how the rights-remedy controversy must also come back
to the antecedent injury addressed by the constitutional provision. Levinson
rejects the view that we start at the top, with the right, and look to the bottom,
the remedy, as a secondary aim. He is right to argue that the top-down,

103. On this score, the Court has also erred by assuming that governments, with widely
dispersed income sources, behave in the same way that private actors do when considering
what standard of care to exercise in order to avoid tort liability. See generally Daryl J.
Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345 (2000).

104. Cf Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (refusing to grant compensatory
damages

under section

1983

for denial

of procedural due process

particularized evidence of a quantifiable injury).

rights without

January 2010]

FOURTHAMENDMENT REMEDIES

589

essentialist approach errs by presupposing the hermetically isolated nature of
rights and remedies, and that we have much to gain by looking at constitutional
remedies from the "bottom." This, however, is not the end of the story. We
must take an even deeper look into the nature of constitutional injury to truly
appreciate both sides of the remedial equilibration insight, as our framing of
this injury influences both the nature of the right. When we do so, state
common law remedies are inadequate because they ignore constitutional injury,
and, instead, to maintain the role the Fourth Amendment plays as a bulwark
against executive overreaching, a robust, federally mandated remedial
machinery is needed.
CONCLUSION

Herring and Pearson represent the remedial flipsides of the Fourth

Amendment coin-raising the bar in the criminal context for excluding
unlawfully obtained evidence, while in the civil context, lowering the bar for
dismissing damages suits without even determining whether, and to what
extent, a constitutional violation occurred. Restricting this remedial structure
can only serve to change, and for all practical purposes, devalue that coin.
Again, Justice Marshall's prose remains timeless: "The government of the

United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish
no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 105

105. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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